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Abstract 
This article compares the regulatory liability of German banks for aiding tax evasion under the 
German Act on Regulatory Offences with the UK corporate offences of failure to prevent the 
facilitation of tax evasion under the Criminal Finances Act 2017. The study demonstrates that 
the approaches share some similarities; however, major differences are also evident. Contrary 
to the German approach, the CFA provisions are designed as strict liability provisions, whereas 
the German regulatory offence requires an intentional or negligent omission to take the 
supervisory measures required to prevent contraventions of the law. Moreover, the scope of the 
offences under UK law is wider than the scope of their German equivalent. In addition, the 
CFA provisions do not place limits on the amount of fines that can be imposed. Because of these 
differences, the CFA is likely to be more effective in preventing banks´ aid to tax evasion than 
its German counterpart. Consideration should therefore be given to reforming German law to 
make it more like its UK equivalent, especially in the post-Panama Papers world. 
 
 
I.       Introduction 
Since the leaking of the Panama Papers, tax evasion has received increased attention in the 
United Kingdom (and elsewhere). The recognition that banks and law firms had facilitated the 
evasion of taxes by their clients preceded the passing of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 
(CFA).1 Among other things, the CFA has introduced corporate offences of failure to prevent 
the facilitation of tax evasion, which explicitly address the aid to tax evasion provided by 
corporate bodies such as banks.  
                                                        
  *Dr iur. Malte Wilke, LL.M. (Aberdeen) worked as a trainee lawyer at the German Embassy in Copenhagen  
    and as a public prosecutor in Germany. Currently he is working as a legal advisor for Volkswagen Group.  
    He is also a visiting lecturer at the University of Hanover. His email address is malte.wilke@gmx.de. 
 
**Dr Alisdair MacPherson is a lecturer in commercial law at the University of Aberdeen. His email address is 
alisdair.macpherson@abdn.ac.uk. 
 
1 See e.g. Joanna Dawson, Timothy Edmonds, Antony Seely and Jacqui Beard, Criminal Finances Bill (Bill 75 
of 2016-17), House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No 07739 (2016) 4, 7. The paper is available at 
researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7739/CBP-7739.pdf (accessed 24 February 2019). It 
should be noted that the introduction of the offences mentioned in this article was already on the UK 
government’s agenda but the Panama Papers leak gave fresh impetus to this and was followed by the passing of 
the CFA in 2017.  
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In Germany, corporate liability in relation to tax evasion has also been the focus of 
public and state attention in recent years. However, in comparison to the UK, corporate criminal 
liability does not exist in Germany. There is only the possibility of imposing regulatory fines 
on corporate entities, including banks.  
This article will first examine the German approach to liability of banks for aiding tax 
evasion before considering the UK corporate offences of failure to prevent the facilitation of 
tax evasion. The relevant German law will be covered in greater detail as its content is likely to 
be less familiar to readers. This will be followed by a direct comparison of the respective laws, 
with particular focus on their effectiveness in various respects. Such analysis is of particular 
value at the present time, given that the reform of the German law has been announced in the 
2018 coalition agreement of the governing parties.2 
Clearly, the liability mechanisms used in the UK and Germany are forms of regulating 
the risk of tax evasion, due to its concomitant negative economic and social consequences.3 An 
effective regime of bank liability in this context ought to involve stringent internal procedures, 
which should help limit the possibility that a bank’s services will be used by a party when 
evading tax. As such, comparing the German and UK regimes can help identify varying ways 
in which tax evasion risks can be managed and regulated, and enables us to ascertain the 
respective merits of these approaches.  
 
II.     Germany: The Regulatory Liability of Banks for Aid to Tax Evasion  
 
1.      The Concept of Regulatory Liability  
German criminal law knows no criminal liability of legal persons, since it limits criminal 
liability to natural persons.4  The reason for the rejection of corporate criminal liability in 
German law stems from the attachment of criminal liability to the personal guilt of a natural 
                                                        
2 See p. 126 of the coalition agreement, available under https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente? file=1 
(accessed 26 October 2018). Simultaneously, an academic discussion has been taking place. See, for example, 
Matthias Jahn and Franziska Pietsch, ‘Der NRW-Entwurf für ein Verbandsstrafengesetzbuch. Eine Einführung 
in das Konzept und seine Folgefragen’ [2015] 10 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 1, 1 et sqq; 
Karl-Heinz Krems, ‘Der NRW-Gesetzentwurf für ein Verbandstrafengesetzbuch. Gesetzgeberische Konzeption 
und Konzeption’ [2015] 10 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 5, 5 et sqq.; Mark Pieth, ‘Braucht 
Deutschland ein Unternehmensstrafrecht?’ [2014] 47 Kritische Justiz 276, 276 et sqq.; Klaudia Dawidowicz, 
‘Tagungsbericht: Unternehmen “hinter Gittern”? Braucht Deutschland ein Unternehmens-strafrecht? 14.11.2013 
in Berlin’ [2014] 3 Neue Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-, Steuer und Unternehmens-strafrecht 6, 6 et sqq.  
3 For consideration of the notions of “risk” and “risk regulation”, see e.g. Maria Weimer, “The Origins of ‘Risk’ 
as an Idea and the Future of Risk Regulation” (2017) 8 European Journal of Risk Regulation 10; Colin Scott, 
“Regulation and Risk Today” (2017) 8 European Journal of Risk Regulation 24; and the other contributions to 
that issue. 
4 Markus Brender, Die Neuregelung der Verbandstäterschaft im Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht (Schäuble 
VerlagRheinfelden 1989) 29 et sqq.  
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person.5 Additionally, the concept of corporate criminal liability would not be compatible with 
the nulla poena sine culpa principle of German criminal law, since “innocent people, such as 
shareholders, may be forced to suffer the consequences of the corporate penalty along with, or 
instead of, the persons who were guilty of the offense.”6  
             However, although there is no corporate criminal liability in Germany, heavy fines can 
be imposed on entities under s. 30 of the Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz7 (OWiG). This provision 
states that the responsibility of the owner of a corporation for a regulatory offence causes the 
law to attribute the offence to the company,8 which is the reason why a fine can be imposed 
against the corporation. In comparison to criminal offences, regulatory offences do not allow 
for the imprisonment of offenders and involve less ethical disapproval and moral stigma.9 
Given certain prominent examples of corporate misbehaviour in Germany in recent times, the 
relative blameworthiness of regulatory and criminal offending is a live issue but cannot be 
pursued further within the confines of this article. It should be noted, however, that the OECD 
has recommended that Germany should take measures to improve the deterrent effect of its 
regulatory sanctions.10 In any event, the German law can serve as a case study regarding how a 
jurisdiction without corporate criminal liability may utilise functionally equivalent 
administrative (or regulatory) sanctions to address the facilitation of tax evasion by banks.11 
Recent scholarship in fact indicates a trend towards the “intertwining of fines of criminal and 
administrative nature” across a number of jurisdictions.12 In addition, for efficiency reasons, a 
                                                        
5 Martin Böse, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability in Germany’, in Mark Pieth and Radha Ivory (eds), Corporate 
criminal liability: emergence, convergence and risk (Springer 2011) 227, 230.  
6 Böse, supra, note 5, 231.  
7 This can be translated into English as the (German) Act on Regulatory Offences. 
8 For the general law regarding the German stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft (AG)), see Aktiengesetz 
(AktG), and for the German limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH)), see 
GmbH-Gesetz (GmbHG). These entities are broadly the equivalent of, respectively, the Public Limited Company 
(PLC) and Private Limited Company (Ltd) in UK law. 
9 Cf s. 1(1) OWiG and s. 12 StGB (German Criminal Code). 
10 OECD-Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe für Bestechungsfragen im Internationalen Geschäftsverkehr vom 17 March 
2011, available under https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/48967037.pdf (accessed 6 
February 2019); Gerhard Dannecker und Christoph Dannecker, ‘Europäische und verfassungsrechtliche 
Vorgaben für das materielle und formelle Unternehmensstrafrecht’ [2015] 4 Neue Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-, 
Steuer- und Unternehmensstrafrecht 162, 163, however, rightly point out that the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions does not include an 
obligation to introduce criminal fines as long as regulatory fines have a deterrent effect; Charlotte Schmitt-
Leonardy,‘Zurück in die Zukunft? Zur neuen alten Diskussion um die Unternehmensstrafe und den immer noch 
unzureichenden Verständnis des Problems’ [2015] 10 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 11, 11.   
11 It has to be highlighted, however, that, major German corporations adjust their actions primarily to the 
requirements of US laws, such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, see Michael Kubiciel, ‘Die deutschen 
Unternehmensgeldbußen: Ein nicht wettbewerbsfähiges Modell und seine Alternativen’ [2016] 5 Neue 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-, Steuer- und Unternehmensstrafrecht 178, 179.    
12 Katalin Ligeti and Stanislaw Tosza, “Challenges and Trends in Enforcing Economic and Financial Crime: 
Criminal Law and Alternatives in Europe and the US” in Katalin Ligeti and Stanislaw Tosza (eds), White Collar 
Crime: A Comparative Perspective (Hart 2018) 14 et sqq.; Marc Engelhart, ‘Verbandsverantwortlichkeit – 
Dogmatik und Rechtsvergleichung’ [2015] 4 Neue Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-, Steuer- und 
Unternehmensstrafrecht 201, 203 with further references; Dannecker and Dannecker, supra, note 10, 163; 
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number of systems have departed from criminal sanctions in favour of “parallel enforcement 
regimes”, especially those involving administrative law. 13  However, all systems have in 
common that they want to persuade companies to implement organisational structures designed 
to prevent the commission of corporate offences. It is clear that the potential sanctions motivate 
companies to improve their compliance structures in order to avoid the imposition of those 
sanctions.14 
In this respect, the most relevant regulatory offence in the German context is without 
question, s. 130(1) of OWiG. This provision states:  
 
“Whoever, as the owner of an operation or undertaking, intentionally or negligently 
omits to take the supervisory measures required to prevent contraventions, within the 
operation or undertaking, of duties incumbent on the owner and the violation of which 
carries a criminal penalty or a regulatory fine, shall be deemed to have committed a 
regulatory offence in a case where such contravention has been committed as would 
have been prevented, or made much more difficult, if there had been proper supervision. 
The required supervisory measures shall also comprise appointment, careful selection 
and surveillance of supervisory personnel.”15  
 
Consequently, s. 130(1) OWiG is an omission offence. Furthermore, both the negligent and the 
intentional violation of supervisory duties may result in the imposition of a fine.16  
In general, the “owner” in s. 130(1) OWiG means the proprietor of a business. 
                                                        
Marianne Johanna Hilf, ‘Grundkonzept und Terminologie des österreichischen strafrechtlichen 
Verbandsverantwortlich-keitengesetzes (VbVG)’ [2016] 5 Neue Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-, Steuer- und 
Unternehmensstrafrecht 189, 189 et sqq. with regard to the Austrian approach. Austrian criminal law largely 
aligns with German criminal law, which is why the difference between both approaches is particularly 
interesting. Hilf argues that the Austrian law is not unconstitutional, although this is not undisputed. In this 
respect see also Wolfgang Wohlers, ‘Der Gesetzentwurf zur strafrechtlichen Veranwortlichkeit von 
Unternehmen und sonstigen Verbänden’ [2016] 45 Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht 364, 
374.  
13 Ligeti and Tosza, supra, note 12, 17. An overview of the handling in the EU member states is available under  
https://www.bundestag.de/blob/539400/9f7fe461015429dc5f71c4c3d2816704/wd-7-070-17-pdf-data.pdf 
(accessed 7 February 2019). 
14 Wohlers, supra, note 12, 367. This trend can be observed in Germany and the UK – see below. For the view 
that the introduction of corporate criminal liability in Germany would lead to greater preventative impulses, see 
Gerhard Wagner, ‘Sinn und Unsinn der Unternehmensstrafe. Mehr Prävention durch Kriminalisierung?’ [2016] 
45 Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht 112, 151 et sqq. However, Wagner argues that 
subsidiary corporate criminal liability can be legitimated if it covers cases of diffuse responsibilities within a 
company that cannot be attributed to any individual. See Malte Wilke and Hinrich Rüping, ‘Strafbarkeitsrisiken 
für ausländische Unternehmen gemäß §§ 45, 46 UK Criminal Finances Act’ [2018] Neue Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschafts-, Steuer- und Unternehmensstrafrecht 479, 480, with regard to the handling of this in the UK. 
15 See also Dennis Bock, Aufsichtspflichten, §§ 130, 30 OWiG, in Katharina Beckemper and Thomas Rotsch 
(eds), Handbuch der Criminal Compliance (Nomos 2015) 264, 266 and Wagner, supra, note 14, 116. 
16 Bock, supra, note 15, 264, 280; Lars Niesler, § 130 OWiG, in Jürgen Peter Graf, Markus Jäger and Petra 
Wittig (eds),Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht (C.H. Beck 2011) recital 5. 
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Notwithstanding this, in the case of banks, which are mostly organised as stock corporations, 
the term “owner” relates to its executive committee (otherwise known as its management 
board).17 According to s. 76(1) Aktiengesetz (AktG)18 the executive committee is to manage the 
affairs of the company on its own responsibility. A regulatory liability requires a wilful or 
negligent failure to take supervisory measures. This in turn triggers the regulatory liability of 
the company under ss. 30 and 130(1) OWiG. It follows from this that a bank is not vicariously 
responsible for the acts of its employees within this context, but is instead liable because their 
executive committee has made violations of law possible by neglecting its supervisory duties. 
Any employee of the corporation could be a violator of the law. External collaborators can also 
be relevant offenders, provided that they are in charge of company matters and the company 
has a right to give them instructions.19 At the same time, it is necessary that the delinquent 
employee has acted for the corporation and not as a private individual in his own interest.20 
Accordingly, regulatory liability of the bank for the actions of its employee is excluded if the 
employee acted in his own self-interest and obviously against the interests of the entity.21 Yet 
the law enforcement authorities do not have to investigate the actual offender, if it is obvious 
that it is one of the employees of the company who has committed the violation of law. This 
violation of law can result from a variety of legal obligations under various laws. However, as 
far as banks are concerned, aid for tax evasion under s. 370(1) Abgabenordnung22 (AO) in 
conjunction with s. 27 of the Strafgesetzbuch23 (StGB) is of the greatest relevance for the 
purposes of this article.24 
 
2.   The Criminal Liability of Bank Employees for Aid to Tax Evasion 
a.   Principles of Criminal Liability for Aid  
                                                        
17 Gerhard Manz, Barbara Mayer and Albert Schröder, Die Aktiengesellschaft (7th edn Haufe 2014) 493. Stock 
corporations in Germany have a dual board structure, consisting of a management board (Vorstand) and a 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) – see ss. 76 et sqq. AktG. 
18 Stock Corporation Code.  
19 Michael Lemke and Andreas Mosbacher, Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz: Kommentar (2nd edn Müller 2005) § 
130 recital 5; Bock, supra, note 15, 281 with further references.  
20 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 30 July 1996 – 5 StR 168/96 – published in [1997] 
17 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 30. 
21 Ibid.; Ekkehard Müller, Die Stellung der juristischen Person im Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht (C. F. 
Müller1985) 77 et sqq.  
22 This can be translated as the (German) Fiscal Code. 
23 (German) Criminal Code. 
24 Dennis Bock, ‘Strafrechtliche Aspekte der Compliance-Diskussion - § 130 OWiG als zentrale Norm der 
Criminal Compliance’ [2009] 4 Zeitschrift für internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 68, 72; Klaus Rogall, 
‘Dogmatische und kriminalpolitische Probleme der Aufsichtspflichtverletzung in Betrieben und Unternehmen (§ 
130 OWiG)’ [1986] 97 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 573, 606; Volker Behr, ‘Die 
Strafbarkeit von Bankmitarbeitern als Steuerhinterziehungsgehilfen bei Vermögenstransfer ins Ausland’ [1999] 
18 Wistra 245 et sqq. 
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It must be highlighted that aiding in the sense of s. 27(1) StGB is any action that objectively 
promotes the accomplishment of the offender’s crime. Moreover, the criminal liability of the 
accomplice under s. 27(1) StGB presupposes a criminal act of the offender, which must have 
at least been attempted. 25  It would therefore be sufficient for criminal liability of the 
accomplice, if he promoted the offender’s crime in its preparatory stage.26 At the same time, 
the aiding of the accomplice does not need to be causally responsible for the success of the 
offender’s crime.27  
Furthermore, the required conditional intention of an accomplice can be assumed if he 
knows the criminal act of the offender in its essential characteristics and if he acts in the 
knowledge that his conduct promotes the crime of the offender.28 Notwithstanding this, it is not 
necessary for the accomplice to know every detail of the crime.29 And it is irrelevant whether 
the accomplice seeks the success of the crime or if he does not want it to be committed.30 The 
only relevant aspect is that his aid facilitates the offender’s crime, and that the accomplice is 
aware of this.31 As a result of those considerations, it can be noted that it is sufficient for the 
criminal liability of the accomplice if his aid proves to have increased the risk of the realisation 
of the offence.32 However, if the accomplice does not know that his actions are being used by 
the offender to commit an offence, his assistance might not be considered as aid under s. 27(1) 
of StGB.33 An exception to this exists if the accomplice has recognised that the risk of the 
commission of an offence is very high. In this respect, the accomplice must have made an effort 
to assist an offender who was apparently willing to commit a crime in order for the accomplice 
to make himself criminally liable.34 
                                                        
25 Thomas Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch mit Nebengesetzen (62nd edn Beck 2015) § 27 recital 3.  
26 BGHSt 8, 390; 42, 135; Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 26 October 1984 – 3 StR 
438/84 – published in [1985] 38 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1035; Federal Supreme Court of Germany, 
Court decision from 01 August 2000 – 5 StR 624/99 – published in [2000] 20 Strafverteidiger 492 – [2000] 53 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3010. 
27 BGHSt 2, 130; 54, 140. 
28 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 07 February 2017 – 3 StR 430/16 – published in 
[2017] 37 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 274; Christian Heuking and Sibylle von Coelln, ‘Berufsneutrale 
Handlungen an der Grenze zur Beihilfe im Wirtschaftsstrafrecht’ [2017] 6 Journal der Wirtschaftstrafrechtlichen 
Vereinigung e.V. 157, 158.  
29 BGHSt 42, 135; Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 20 January 2011 – 3 StR 420/10 –    
published in [2011] 31 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 399.  
30 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 09 May 2017 – 1 StR 265/16 – published in [2017] 
70 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3798. 
31 BGHSt 42, 135.  
32 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 07 February 2017 – 3 StR 430/16 – published in 
[2017] 37 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 274, 275.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court ruling from 20 September 1999 – 5 StR 729/98 – published in 
[2000] 20 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 34; Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil – Band 2: Besondere 
Erscheinungsformen der Straftat (Beck 2003) § 26 recital 218 et sqq.; Heuking and von Coelln, supra, note 28, 
162.  
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b.   Criminal Liability of Bank Employees for Aid to Tax Evasion 
(i)  The Problem of Neutral Actions 
However, the question arises whether employees of a bank can be prosecuted in the context of 
their professional activity for aiding tax evasion. In particular, it has proved to be problematic 
whether aid to tax evasion can also be met by neutral behaviour, such as everyday services like 
the transfer of money on foreign accounts.35 The courts consider that an extensive interpretation 
of externally neutral aid would lead to legal uncertainty and this is also the prevailing view 
among commentators.36 It is for this reason that they link the punishability of neutral actions, 
which are typical of the occupation, to the inner volition of the accomplice. 37 Thus, the one 
who is performing a neutral act with the intent to promote the crime of the offender makes 
himself criminally liable as an accomplice.38  
 
(ii)  The Rulings of the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) 
Apart from these considerations, the offender must have made a false tax return to be criminally 
liable for tax evasion under s. 370(1) of AO. However, a bank and its employees are not 
involved in preparing the offender’s tax return. It is the responsibility of each taxpayer to decide 
whether or not to disclose all tax-relevant facts in his or her tax return.39 Irrespective of this, 
employees of banks can provide aid to tax evasion of their clients. The decisive factor is that 
aid to tax evasion can be provided by employees of banks in a preparatory stage.40 In particular, 
the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) ruled that a bank employee who assisted a taxpayer in disguising 
his cash payments from a German bank account to a foreign account would be criminally liable, 
if he knew that the customer wanted to evade taxes in this way.41 Notwithstanding this, the bank 
                                                        
35 Christoph Trzaskolik, ‘Die Strafrechtspflege und das Steuerrecht – Zu der Durchsuchungsaktion bei einer 
Großbank’ [1994] 47 Der Betrieb 550, 550; Brigitte Tag,‘Beihilfe durch neutrales Verhalten’ [1997] 72 
Juristische Rundschau 49, 49 et sqq.; Wolfgang Wohlers, ‘Hilfeleistung und erlaubtes Risiko – zur 
Einschränkung der Strafbarkeit gemäß § 27 StGB’ [2000] 20 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 169, 169 with 
further references; Behr, supra note 24, 247 et sqq. 
36 BGHSt 29, 99, 101; 46, 112; Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 14 February 1985 – 4 
StR27/85 – published in Strafverteidiger [1985] 279; Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision 
from20 September 1999 – 5 StR 729/98 – published in [2000] 20 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 34; Tag, supra, 
note 35, 50; Christian Baumgarte,‘Die Strafbarkeit von Rechtsanwälten und anderen Beratern wegen 
unterlassener Konkursanmeldung’ [1992] 11 Wistra 41, 43 et sqq.  
37 Nevertheless, the courts will also take objective behaviour of the accomplice into consideration, see BGHSt 
50, 331; Heuking and von Coelln, supra note 28, 162, 164.  
38 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 22 January 2014 – 5 StR 468/12 – [2014] 3 Neue 
Zeit-schrift für Steuer-, Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensstrafrecht 139, 141 et sqq.  
39 S. 370(1) German Fiscal Code refer to the violation of the obligation to disclose all tax-relevant facts. 
40 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 08 November 2011 – 3 StR 310/11 – published in 
[2012] 32 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 264; BGHSt 14, 123; Behr, supra, note 24, 247.  
41 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 01 August 2000 – 5 StR 624/99 – published in 
[2000] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3010; Andreas Rischar, ‘Die Selbstanzeige im Lichte der 
Bankendurchsuchun-gen’ [1998] 52 Betriebs-Berater 1341 et sqq. 
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employee would not be liable to prosecution if he only considers it possible that the bank client 
wants to evade taxes. A bank employee would, nevertheless, be criminally liable if he thought 
it highly likely that the bank client wanted to evade taxes and he assisted him anyway.42 In this 
regard, reference can be made to a decision of the BGH from last year.43 The BGH decided in 
this appeal proceeding that the decision of the district court Frankfurt/Main, which had 
sentenced employees of Deutsche Bank (for aiding a tax evasion) to imprisonment, was lawful. 
The district court had sentenced them, because they had organised extensive trading in emission 
rights in 2009 and 2010, in which a group of offenders had evaded sales taxes to the value of 
hundreds of millions of Euros. The court ruled that the employees of Deutsche Bank would 
have realised that the offender group wanted to evade taxes, if they had carried out an adequate 
risk analysis.  
 
3.   Compliance System as Opportunity for Exculpation 
As a result, it is decisive for the avoidance of fines under ss. 130(1) and 30 OWiG that the banks 
have taken measures that are necessary to make aiding tax evasion more difficult.44 In other 
words, it is up to the banks to implement efficient criminal compliance systems to prevent or 
immediately detect crimes committed by their employees.45 The criminal compliance system 
must identify and assess criminal liability risks and embrace a risk avoidance strategy. 
Moreover, the criminal compliance system must continuously monitor the corporate activities 
of the bank staff for criminal conduct.46 However, the executive committee does not have to 
guarantee complete monitoring. The scope of the monitoring obligations is determined by the 
reasonableness and the practical feasibility of the monitoring.47 Nonetheless, the executive 
committee must secure regular spot checks.48 Finally, the executive committee needs to set up 
a whistle blowing system to encourage employees to report criminal conduct.49   
                                                        
42 Federal Supreme Court, Court decision from 20 September 1999 – 5 StR 729/98 – published in [1999] 18 
Wistra 459, 460; Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 15 May 2018 – 1 StR 159/17 – 
published in [2018] Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht Rechtsprechungs-Rundschau 257. 
43 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 15 May 2018 – 1 StR 159/17 – published in [2018] 
Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht Rechtsprechungs-Rundschau 257. 
44 Bock, supra, note 15, 269 et sqq.; Dennis Bock, Criminal Compliance (Nomos 2011) 459 et sqq.  
45 In this regard, the District Court of Munich has ruled most recently that members of the executive committee 
of a corporation have to ensure, that the company is supervised in such a way that no violations of the law, such 
as bribes to officials of a foreign state or to foreign private individuals occur. Moreover, the court stated in its 
ruling that the members of the executive committee only fulfil their supervisory obligations if they set up an 
effective compliance system. See District Court of Munich I, Court decision from 10 December 2013 – 5 HK O 
1387/10 – published in [2014] 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 345. 
46 Bock, supra, note 15, 264, 270 et sqq. 
47 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, Court decision from 12 November 1998 – 2 Ss (OWi) 385/98 – (OWi) 
112/98 III – published in [1999] 19 NStZ-RR 151. 
48 Bock, supra, note 15, 277.  
49 Bock, supra, note 44, 732 et sqq.  
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In this regard the BGH has ruled that an effective criminal compliance system can 
significantly reduce any possible fine under s. 30 OWiG, even if an employee has committed 
an offence. However, in order to be subject to a reduced fine, the executive committee must 
rigorously eliminate the weaknesses in the company´s compliance system following the 
disclosure of legal violations of employees.50  
 
4.   Fines for Violations of Supervisory Duties        
In principle, a fine up to €1,000,000 might be imposed on a corporation under ss. 130(3) 
sentence 1 OWiG, if the executive committee intentionally violated its supervisory duties under 
s. 130(1) OWiG. 51  Compared with this, a fine up to €500,000 might be imposed on a 
corporation, if the executive committee negligently violated its supervisory duties.52 Yet it is 
possible for fines for intentional or negligent violations to be higher still. S. 130(3) sentence 2 
OWiG refers to s. 30(2) sentence 3 OWiG, and the latter provision states:  “If the Act refers to 
this provision, the maximum amount of the regulatory fine shall be multiplied by ten for the 
offences referred to in the Act.“ Accordingly, a fine up to €10,000,000 can be imposed on a 
corporation if the executive committee intentionally violated its supervisory duties under s. 
130(1) OWiG. In the case of a negligent violation of supervisory duties, the maximum amount 
of the fine is €5,000,000. However, the particular amount of the fine to be imposed is 
determined in accordance with s. 130(3) OWiG. The decisive factor for the scope of the fine is 
the individual allegation against the executive committee of the corporation, whereby the 
severity of the violation of the duty of supervision is accorded pivotal importance. In the light 
of the purpose of s. 130(1) OWiG, the execution, the significance and seriousness of the 
violation must also be taken into account.53 Another factor for determining the amount of the 
fine is the financial situation of the company. In particular, the amount of the fine must not 
threaten the existence of the company.54  
           To give just one recent example: The district court of Düsseldorf has ruled in a 
significant decision that a fine can be imposed under s. 130(1) OWiG55 against a bank, which 
has trained its employees to help the bank’s clients with their tax evasion. The decisive issue in 
                                                        
50 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 09.05.2017 – 1 StR 265/16 – published in [2017] 70 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3798. 
51 According to s.30 (2a) sentence 1, a fine can even be imposed in the event of a universal succession or of a 
partial universal succession by means of splitting under s. 123(1) German Reorganisation Act. The regulatory 
fine under ss. 130(3) sentence 2, 30(2) sentence 3 OWiG might be imposed on the legal successor.  
52 S. 17(2) OWiG.  
53 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 24.04.1991 – KRB 5/90 – published in [1991] 10 
Wistra 268.  
54 Böse, supra, note 5, 242.  
55 In combination with ss. 17(4) and 30(1), (2) sentence 1 No. 1, (3) OWiG. 
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this court ruling was the fact that a member of the executive committee knew about this practice 
and approved it. The district court imposed a fine of €149,000,000 on the bank in this regulatory 
proceeding. However, it must be stressed that the actual fine was only €1,000,000. The 
remaining balance of €148,000,000 is only a levy on the financial benefits that the Bank has 
acquired as a result of its violation of its supervisory duties under s. 130(1) OWiG.56 In this 
respect s. 17(4) OWiG states:  
The regulatory fine shall exceed the financial benefit that the perpetrator has obtained 
from commission of the regulatory offence. If the statutory maximum does not suffice 
for that purpose, it may be exceeded. 
 
III.  UK:  Corporate Offence of Failure to Prevent the Facilitation of Tax Evasion  
1. General 
The UK Criminal Finances Act 2017 (CFA), ss. 45 and 46, which came into force on 30th 
September 2017, punish the failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion.57 These two 
criminal offences, 58  which are designed as strict liability offences, seek to circumvent 
difficulties prosecuting companies under the background criminal law due to the shortcomings 
of the identification doctrine.59 This doctrine requires that a company can only be liable for a 
crime if the necessary acts and state of mind of the crime can be imputed to those who were the 
“directing mind and will” of the company at the relevant time.60 This is a particularly difficult 
test to meet for the prosecution of large companies, including banks.61  By utilising strict 
liability, the CFA provisions make it simpler to prosecute banks and other corporate entities 
that are complicit in the evasion of taxes.  In particular, ss. 45 and 46 enable the courts to impose 
fines on bodies corporate and partnerships if their employees have aided third parties with tax 
evasion.  
                                                        
56 District Court of Düsseldorf, Court ruling from 21 November 2011 – 10 Kls 14/11 – published in [2013] 33 
Wistra 80. 
57 As noted by Andrew Ashworth, ‘A new generation of omission offences?’ [2018] Criminal Law Review 354, 
these are examples of a growing number of omission offences in English law. See also Celia Wells, ‘Corporate 
failure to prevent economic crime – a proposal’ [2017] Criminal Law Review 426. 
58 Strictly speaking, it can be contended that the provisions only extend liability for existing offences rather than 
introducing new ones – Tim Corfield and Julia Schaefer, ‘The taxman cometh: the criminal offences of failure to 
prevent tax evasion’ [2017] 23 Trust and Trustees 1030, 1030. 
59 Jenny Wheater and Elly Proudlock, ‘Commentary: UK corporate offence of failure to prevent the facilitation 
of tax evasion’ [2018] 19 Business Law International 178, 178.  
60 See e.g. Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass [1972] AC 153. For a brief summary of the relevant law, see e.g. 
Nicholas Ryder, ‘“Too scared to prosecute and too scared to jail?” A critical and comparative analysis of 
enforcement of financial crime legislation against corporations in the USA and the UK’ [2018] Journal of 
Criminal Law 245, 257-258; Wilke and Rüping, supra, note 14, 480. 
61 See e.g. Ashworth, supra, note 57, 359. 
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The domestic variant provided by s. 45 CFA covers the failure to prevent facilitation of 
UK tax evasion offences. Notwithstanding this, the imposition of a corporate fine does not 
require that the company being sanctioned is based in the UK.62 Foreign companies can also be 
sanctioned pursuant to s. 45 CFA if they evade UK taxes.63 By contrast, s. 46 CFA deals with 
the failure to prevent facilitation of foreign tax evasion offences, and can be referred to as the 
foreign variant. For this latter offence, there must be a particular connection with the UK: that 
the body is incorporated (or partnership formed) under the law of any part of the UK; that the 
entity carries on business or part of a business in the UK; or any conduct constituting part of 
the foreign tax evasion facilitation offence takes place in the UK.64  
 
2.   The Domestic Variant under s. 45 CFA 
Section 45(5) CFA provides that “UK tax evasion facilitation offence” means an offence under 
the law of any part of the UK consisting of: 
 
(a) being knowingly concerned in, or in taking steps with a view to, the fraudulent 
evasion of a tax by another person;  
(b) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of a UK tax evasion 
offence, or 
(c) being involved art and part in the commission of an offence consisting of being 
knowingly concerned in, or in taking steps with a view to, the fraudulent evasion of a 
tax.  
 
A relevant body, such as a bank or other body corporate,65 is guilty of an offence of failing to 
prevent the facilitation of UK tax evasion if a person acting in the capacity of a person 
associated with the relevant body commits a UK tax evasion facilitation offence.66 The person 
associated with the relevant body may be a natural or legal person.67 A person acts in the 
capacity of a person associated with an entity if the person is: (a) an employee of the entity who 
is acting in the capacity of an employee; (b) an agent of the entity (other than an employee) and 
is acting in the capacity of an agent; or (c) any other person who performs services for or on 
                                                        
62 See s. 44(2). 
63 As noted by Wheater and Proudlock, supra, note 59, 180, entirely non-UK conduct by a non-UK entity can 
constitute the offence if it is directed towards evading UK tax. However, they identify enforcement difficulties in 
such a context. See also Karl Laird, ‘The Criminal Finances Act 2017 – an introduction’ [2017] Criminal Law 
Review 915, 938. 
64 S. 46(2).  
65 Or partnership. See s. 44(2). 
66 S. 45(1). 
67 S. 44(4). 
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behalf of the entity who is acting in the capacity of a person performing such services.68 The 
relevant body will not, however, be liable if the person is acting outside the context of the 
relationship with the relevant body on a “frolic of their own” in facilitating someone else’s tax 
evasion.69  Relevant associations are especially likely to arise in situations involving financial 
advisers, financial brokers, legal entities and individuals providing tax-related advisory services 
or conducting transactions, since ss. 45 and 46 CFA clearly have, within their sights, law firms, 
banks and tax consultants dealing with third-party tax matters. It is not decisive for the question 
of association whether the person is employed by the company or integrated in its organisational 
structure. The question of association must rather be determined on a case-by-case basis and 
depends on the capacity in which the person is acting, not just on the formal position held.70 
Nevertheless, if an associated person has acted only in self-interest, then this will need to be 
proved to negate the association and thereby show that the person was not acting for the entity 
and consequently that there is no criminal liability under s. 45.71 
Section 45(2) CFA provides that it is a defence to the s. 45 offence to prove that when 
the UK tax evasion facilitation offence was committed, the entity, such as a bank, “had in place 
such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect [the entity] 
to have in place”, or that “it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect [the entity] 
to have any prevention procedures in place.” The company must therefore show that it has taken 
sufficient measures to prevent associated persons facilitating the tax evasion of third parties. 
Consequently, the company must provide evidence that it has implemented a suitable criminal 
compliance system. 72  The question that always arises in this respect is which criminal 
compliance system is suitable. According to the HMRC Guidance, each company has to 
consider the risks in relation to its own business.73 Companies must assess which persons 
associated with them have the possibility of facilitating tax evasion of third parties. 
Furthermore, companies must conduct a risk analysis of their financial products and services. 
Where appropriate, companies are also obliged to carry out a tax risk analysis with regard to 
their clients’ residences, the location of their clients’ investment capital and the country of 
                                                        
68  S. 44(4). 
69 See CFA Explanatory Notes, para. 302. For discussion of when a party may be acting outside the capacity of 
their relationship with the relevant body, see Karl Laird, ‘The Criminal Finances Act 2017 – an introduction’ 
[2017] Criminal Law Review 915, 931 et sqq. 
70 Ashworth, supra, note 57, 360; Karl Laird, ‘The Criminal Finances Act 2017 – an introduction’ [2017] 
Criminal Law Review 915, 931 et sqq.  
71 Ashworth, supra, note 57, 360; Laird, supra, note 67, 931 et sqq.; Criminal Finances Bill – Explanatory Notes, 
para. 302.  
72 For some discussion of related issues, see e.g. Laird, supra, note 70, 934 et sqq. 
73 See HMRC, Tackling tax evasion: Government guidance for the corporate offences of failure to prevent the 
criminal facilitation of tax evasion (2017). 
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destination of the respective investments.74 Subsequently, companies must take the necessary 
preventive measures as a result of their risk assessment, insofar as they are considered 
proportionate. There are six guiding principles provided by the HMRC with respect to the 
development of measures to prevent facilitation: (i) the proportionality of risk-based prevention 
procedures; (ii) top level commitment; (iii) risk assessment; (iv) due diligence; (v) 
communication; and (vi) monitoring and review. 
 
In addition, the explanatory notes accompanying the CFA state that “only reasonable or 
proportionate procedures, as opposed to fool-proof or excessively burdensome procedures 
(…)” are required.75 However, there is still a significant amount of uncertainty as to what is 
reasonable or proportionate in a given context.76 Aside from this, the companies are obliged to 
continuously monitor their compliance systems.77  Perhaps the greatest consequence of the 
legislative provisions is the introduction of compliance systems by banks and other major 
corporate entities, which should assist in minimising their complicity in tax evasion. 
In the event that an entity is found guilty of an offence under s. 45, the entity is liable to 
pay a fine and this is without limit for a conviction on indictment.78 Given that the legislation 
was only recently introduced, there is not yet any case law to flesh out the particular factors that 
will be taken into account when considering appropriate levels of fines.  
 
3.  The Foreign Variant under s. 46 CFA 
As noted above, section 46 CFA involves failure to prevent facilitation of foreign tax evasion 
 offences. According to s. 46(5) CFA, a foreign tax evasion offence means conduct which: 
 
(a) amounts to an offence under the law of a foreign country, 
(b) relates to a breach of a duty relating to a tax imposed under the law of that country, 
and 
(c) would be regarded by the courts of any part of the United Kingdom as amounting 
to being knowingly concerned in, or in taking steps with a view to, the fraudulent 
                                                        
74Arun Srivastava, Mark Simpson and others, ‘Financial crime update’ [2018] Compliance Officer Bulletin 1, 
11; Wheater and Proudlock, supra, note 59, 182 et sqq; Corfield and Schaefer, supra, note 58, 1032 et sqq.  
75 Explanatory Notes, para. 304. 
76 This is despite the guidance and examples given in HMRC, Tackling tax evasion: Government guidance for 
the corporate offences of failure to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion (2017). 
77 Liz Campbell, ‘Corporate liability and the criminalisation of failure’ [2018] 12 Law and Financial Market 
Review 57, 61; Wheater and Proudlock, supra, note 59, 182 et sqq.  
78 S. 45(8). As noted by Wheater and Proudlock, supra, note 59, 184, orders for confiscation of assets and 
deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) may also be used. DPAs enable a prosecution to be suspended for a 
period of time so long as particular conditions are met. There are also potentially regulatory sanctions that can 
result from relevant behaviour by corporate entities – see Corfield and Schaefer, supra, note 58, 1032. 
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evasion of that tax. 
 
In other respects, the conditions within s. 45 CFA also apply to s. 46. This includes with respect 
to the required involvement of an associated person, the defence available and the penalty for 
the offence. However, two additional factual conditions must be fulfilled for liability under s. 
46. The respective company must have a nexus with the UK and there must exist dual 
criminality. The required nexus between a company and the UK can be assumed if the foreign 
entity is incorporated under UK law, operates from the UK or has a UK branch.79 It can also be 
assumed if a person associated with a foreign company has carried out the facilitation of tax 
evasion in the UK.80 With respect to dual criminality in the sense of s. 46(5) CFA, this requires 
that the tax evasion is punishable under the tax criminal law of the respective foreign state and 
that the tax evasion would be punishable under UK law if the tax evasion concerned UK taxes 
and not foreign ones.81 Nevertheless, the application of liability to entities for failing to prevent 
the facilitation of foreign tax evasion is broad in its scope and a welcome means by which the 
UK is showing its willingness to recognise the problems caused by tax evasion on a global 
scale. 
  
IV.  Comparison between the German and UK Approaches 
 
1. Points of Similarity 
Based on the discussion above, it will be apparent that there are various ways in which the 
relevant UK and German law already align. First of all, the German and UK approaches make 
the imposition of fines subject to the violation of the respective bank’s own supervisory duties. 
Although in Germany, in contrast to the UK, no corporate criminal liability exists, the 
attribution of employees’ punishable behaviour to their employers leads to similar results. In 
this respect, it must be emphasised that no vicarious responsibility (in the strict sense) applies 
in both countries. Liability does not arise merely because of the attribution of an employee’s 
punishable behaviour to the company. Instead, as already mentioned, the imposition of fines in 
both countries is linked to the violation of the company’s own supervisory duties. At the same 
time, in both legal systems banks have the opportunity to exculpate themselves through an 
effective criminal compliance system. In the UK, only proportionate or reasonable steps require 
to be taken. This means that corporate criminal liability cannot be assumed if the bank could 
                                                        
79 Laird, supra, note 70, 936.  
80 Ibid.  
81 For discussion, see Corfield and Schaefer, supra, note 58, 1032. 
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have prevented the facilitation to tax evasion only with disproportionate effort. The same 
approach basically applies in Germany, where the BGH has already ruled that the subsequent 
elimination of weaknesses of a criminal compliance system following the disclosure of legal 
violations committed by employees can significantly reduce possible fines.82 
Apart from this, German and UK tax crime law make similar demands as regards aiding 
tax evasion.83 Interestingly, the requirements for association of employees with their employers 
are also in line in both countries. This becomes clear especially with regard to collaborators. 
An association can be affirmed in Germany if the external collaborators are in charge of 
company matters and the bank has a right to give them instructions. The same requirements 
apply in the UK. Simultaneously, it is necessary in both countries that delinquent employees 
acted for the company and not for themselves. If an employee acted only in his own interest, an 
association with the company is insufficient to confer liability on the company in both 
jurisdictions. 
 
2. Points of Divergence 
On the other hand, there are also some significant differences between the approaches. 
First, the fines that can be imposed in Germany are limited. The maximum amount of a fine is 
€10,000,000. In this respect, it has to be stressed that the traditionally low fines in Germany 
have proven in the past to be of little suitability to prevent quasi-criminal behaviour in 
companies.84 In contrast, unlimited fines can be imposed in the UK against banks for their 
failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion. Obviously, this should increase the willingness 
of banks to implement effective criminal compliance systems and help prevent the facilitation 
of tax evasion.  
Even more decisive, however, is the fact that the scope of s. 46 CFA is well beyond that 
of ss. 30 and 130(1) OWiG, since s. 46 CFA allows the sanctioning of the evasion of foreign 
taxes, if both the UK nexus and dual criminality requirements are met. Ss. 30 and 130 (1) 
OWiG, on the other hand, sanction only the evasion of German taxes, which is due to the fact 
                                                        
82 Federal Supreme Court of Germany, Court decision from 09 May 2017 – 1 StR 265/16 – published in [2017] 
70 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3798.  
83 See Stefanie Schott, § 370 Abgabenordnung, in Silke Hüls and Tilman Reichling (eds), Steuerstrafrecht (C.F. 
Müller 2016) 41, 55 et sqq. with further information about the requirements for aid to tax evasion in Germany.  
84 See for example district court of Munich I, Court ruling from 04 October 2007 – 5 KLs 563 45994/07 and 
Sebastian Wolf, Die Siemens-Korruptionsaffäre – ein Überblick, in Peter Graeff, Karenina Schröder and 
Sebastian Wolf (eds), Der Korruptionsfall Simens (Nomos 2009) 9 et sqq. about the Siemens case of bribery. 
The most recent example involves searches carried out by the public prosecutor’s office against Deutsche Bank, 
due to money laundering suspicions on 29th November 2018. See https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/ 
unternehmen/geldwaesche-verdacht-ermittler-durchsuchen-deutsche-bank-15915583.html (accessed 6 February 
2019).  
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that the territorial scope of the OWiG is limited to German territory.85 In this regard, the wide 
scope of the UK corporate offences of failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion seem to 
be more appropriate in the post-Panama Papers world, as those documents revealed that 
national approaches to tackling tax evasion by globally operating companies may be ineffective 
in a number of respects.  
 
3. Reform of German Law on the UK Model?  
The question arises, therefore, whether the German position should be reformed in line with the 
UK approach. In this respect, it would appear reasonable to extend the territorial applicability 
of the OWiG in a manner similar to the CFA. The Panama Papers have exemplified that a less 
domestically limited approach is desirable. At the same time, an increase in the maximum 
amount of fines should be considered, since an increase might promote the effective execution 
of criminal compliance systems in corporations.86 This demand also corresponds to the position 
of the OECD.87  
               Concerning these two matters, the UK approach could serve as a model. 88 
Notwithstanding this, the concept of strict liability is no model for German law. In German law, 
it is irrevocable that the imposition of a fine requires guilt. An objective responsibility that 
disregards subjective guilt would be unconstitutional in Germany.89 Furthermore, despite the 
suitable extra moral opprobrium that may accompany a crime rather than regulatory liability, it 
                                                        
85 S. 5(1) OWiG.  
86 At present, the coalition government is already considering an increase in the maximum amount of fines. The 
coalition states in its agreement: “Wir werden sicherstellen, dass bei Wirtschaftskriminalität grundsätzlich auch 
die von Fehlverhalten von Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern profitierenden Unternehmen stärker sanktioniert 
werden”. See p. 126 of the coalition agreement, available under https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/ 
dokumente?file=1 (accessed 26 October 2018).  
87OECD-Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe für Bestechungsfragen im Internationalen Geschäftsverkehr vom 17 March 
2011, available under https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/48967037.pdf (accessed 6 
February 2019).   
88 There is, however, some uncertainty regarding what precise factors will determine the appropriate amount of a 
fine in the UK in any given case. 
89 This line of reasoning was opposed by the US Supreme Court more than one hundred years ago. It stated in 
NY Railroad v US (1909) 492: “If, for example, the invisible, intangible essence or air which we term a 
corporation can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay down irontracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can intend 
to do it, and can act therein as well viciously and virtuously.” However, in Germany this argument would still be 
unconstitutional, see Federal Supreme Court, Court decision from 18 March 1952 – GSSt 2/51 – published in 
[1952] 7 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 593; Court decisions of the Constitutional Court of Germany 9, 169; 
20, 331; 23, 132; 25, 285; 45, 259; 96, 140; 123, 267; Schünemann, ‘Die aktuelle Forderung eines 
Verbandsstrafrechts – Ein kriminalpolitischer Zombie’ [2014] 9 Zeitschrift für internationale Strafrechts-
dogmatik 1 (2). It follows from this, that the common law approach is not an option for Germany, see Bernd 
Schünemann, Strafrechtliche Sanktionen gegen Wirtschaftsunternehmen?, in Ulrich Sieber and Gerhard 
Dannecker (eds), Strafrecht und Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, Dogmatik, Rechtsvergleich und Rechtstatsachen – FS für 
Klaus Tiedemann zum 70. Geburtstag, 2008, 429 (431). Also see Ligeti and Tosza, supra, note 12, 2 et seq, for 
discussion of the applicability of ECHR to administrative proceedings. 
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is not possible to impose criminal liability on a bank itself under German law, in the manner 
that exists in UK law.  
 However, the imposition of criminal liability on a bank itself is not necessarily 
required. According to our view, it would instead be suitable if the OWiG were adapted in the 
above-noted ways.90 Apart from this, it would also be desirable if new forms of sanctions were 
introduced to the OWiG. Sanctions in the form of official instructions or the exclusion of tax 
benefits or subsidies would be acceptable. 91  Moreover, the imposition of a time limited 
operating ban on responsible company divisions would also be an appropriate sanction. Thus, 
additional incentives would be created for corporations to comply with the law.92 With regard 
to banks, these sanctions are expected to prove more effective than regulatory fines. This 
already follows from the fact that the current regulatory fines do not have a particularly 
deterrent effect in view of potential high profits through criminal activities.93 However, these 
considerations are not limited to Germany, they also apply to those states that have a concept 
of corporate criminal liability, such as the UK.  
      Another relevant aspect is the deepening of international cooperation in order to tackle 
tax evasion effectively. Tax offences often have an international dimension, e.g. if assets are 
hidden abroad. It is for this reason that an effective fight against tax evasion requires a global 
approach. Most noteworthy in this respect are the reform initiatives of the OECD. The OECD 
is calling for an international agreement to cooperate on the exchange of information, the 
submission of documents, the collection of evidence and the transfer of persons for questioning. 
At the same time, the OECD advocates the implementation of arrangements for the freezing 
and confiscation of assets and joint investigations.94 The Council Directive 2011/16/EU on 
                                                        
90 See Dannecker and Dannecker, supra, note 10, 163 and Engelhart, supra, note 12, 203 with further references. 
It would also be reasonable if Germany introduced a central corruption register as proposed by the OECD: 
OECD-Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe für Bestechungsfragen im Internationalen Geschäftsverkehr vom 17.3.2011, 
available under https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/48967037.pdf (accessed 6 
February 2019); Christian Heuking and Sybille von Coelln, ‘Die aktuelle Diskussion um Buße oder Strafe für 
Unternehmen’ [2014] 69 Betriebs-Berater 3016, 3020.    
91 Thomas Kutschaty, ‘Unternehmensstrafrecht: Deutschland debattiert, der Rest Europas handelt’ [2013] 
Deutsche Richterzeitung 16, 17. 
92 Wagner, supra, note 14, 122 points out, that the main difference between the failed North Rhine-Westphalian 
draft law on the introduction of a corporate criminal liability and the current legal situation was in terms of the 
legal consequences. The draft bill would have allowed for a more dynamic sanctioning in each individual case. 
93 Michael Kubiciek, Menschenrechte und Unternehmensstrafrecht – eine europäische Herausforderung, 
available under https://www.jura.uni-augsburg.de/lehrende/professoren/kubiciel/downloads/ 
koelner_papiere/menschenrechte_unternehmensstrafrecht.pdf  (accessed 6 February 2019) points out that the 
regulatory fines frame has a higher sanctioning effect on small and medium-sized companies. 
94 OECD, Bekämpfung der Steuerkriminalität: Die zehn zentralen Grundsätze, OECD, Paris, available under  
http://www.oecd.org/tax/crime/fighting-tax-crime-the-ten-global-principles.htm (accessed 6 February 2019). 
Moreover, the OECD study “International Co-operation against Tax Crimes and Other Financial Crimes: A 
Catalogue of the Main Instruments” provides a good summary of the achieved so far and the further required 
measures. The study is available under http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/international-co-
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administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and the OECD Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters can be seen as initial steps to achieve these goals.95 
Notwithstanding this, the Panama Papers and other more recent developments have made it 
clear that there is still a long way to go before tax evasion can be successfully combated on a 
global level.96 
 
V. Conclusion 
Certain aspects regarding the liability of banks for aiding or failing to prevent the 
facilitation of tax evasion in German and UK law are comparable. Fines are imposed when 
banks have failed to fulfil their duties and adequate compliance regimes can enable those banks 
to escape liability. Banks are well placed to manage the risk of associated persons providing 
services in a way that could enable others to evade tax. The regulatory environments in 
Germany and the UK require banks to adopt appropriate measures for dealing with the relevant 
risk, which should diminish the opportunities that other parties have for evading taxes. 
Yet, in a number of respects, the liability of banks under the equivalent laws in Germany 
and the UK appear highly divergent. There is no criminal liability for corporate entities under 
German law nor strict liability. By contrast, both of these elements are part of the UK law. The 
fact that ss. 45 and 46 CFA are strict liability provisions facilitates investigation and 
prosecution. Contrary to the UK, many proceedings for violations of supervisory duties under 
ss. 30 and 130 (1) OWiG are put to an end in the preliminary stage by paying a fine. This is due 
to the reason that the subjective facts of the offence are difficult to prove. The UK approach has 
a wider scope and can be expected to be more effective to prevent aid to tax evasion committed 
by bank employees and other associated persons. The reasons for this are the availability of 
unlimited fines and the potentially global scope of ss. 45 and 46 CFA. 
The reform of the German law is currently being considered and the approach in the UK 
can serve as a model of reform to a limited extent. Although it is not possible to introduce 
corporate criminal liability or strict liability due to wider German law, removing restrictions on 
fines and extending the scope of liability under German law to tax evasion of non-German 
                                                        
operation-against-tax-crimes-and-other-financial-crimes-a-catalogue-of-the-main-instruments.pdf (accessed 7 
February 2019). 
95 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/convention-on-mutual-administrative-assistance-in-tax-
matters.htm (accessed 7 February 2019). 
96 http://www.oecd.org/tax/kampf-gegen-steuerhinterziehung-ist-globale-aufgabe.htm (accessed 7 February 
2019); UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International tax cooperation and sovereign debt crisis 
resolution: reforming global governance to ensure no one is left behind, available under 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/CDP-bp-2018-41.pdf   
(accessed 7 February 2019); http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/illicit-financial-flows-iffs 
(accessed 7 February 2019). 
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taxes. Given that it has proved highly problematic to obtain international consensus regarding 
liability for tax evasion, it is desirable for major jurisdictions like Germany and the UK to at 
least have wide-ranging liability for banks’ involvement in facilitating tax evasion.  
 
 
 
